[Opinion] Section 148A Notices to Deceased Assessees | Delhi HC Jurisdictional Conflict

Keshav Dwivedi – [2026] 186 taxmann.com 780 (Article)

The jurisprudence surrounding reassessment proceedings against deceased assessees under Sections 147, 148 and 148A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has consistently evolved around one foundational principle: jurisdiction must validly exist at the inception of proceedings. The Delhi High Court’s decision in Hardeep Singh Being Legal Heir of Late Sardar Swarup Singh v. ITO, order dated 15.10.2025 in W.P.(C) No. 9297 of 2022 emphatically reaffirmed this principle by holding that a notice under Section 148A(b) issued in the name of a deceased assessee is fundamentally void and incapable of being cured by subsequent proceedings.

However, the subsequent decision of the Delhi High Court in Vijender Pal Jain L/H Late Rishi Raman Jain v. ACIT, order dated 08.05.2026 in W.P.(C) No. 12617 of 2022 appears to depart from this settled jurisdictional doctrine and introduces a problematic dilution of foundational principles governing reassessment proceedings. The judgment, with respect, conflates defects in service with defects in jurisdiction, and in doing so, stands in tension with the earlier coordinate bench ruling in Hardeep Singh, notably rendered by one of the very judges who later participated in Vijender Pal Jain.

1. The Foundational Principle in Hardeep Singh

In Hardeep Singh, the factual matrix was straightforward. The assessee had died prior to issuance of notice under Section 148A(b), and the Revenue had already been informed of the death before issuance of such notice. Despite this, the Assessing Officer proceeded to issue the foundational notice in the name of the deceased assessee.

The Revenue attempted to salvage the proceedings by contending that subsequent notices under Section 148A(d) and Section 148 had been issued in the name of the deceased assessee “through legal heir,” and therefore the defect stood cured.

The High Court categorically rejected this contention and held:

“when the initial notice itself was erroneous/defective, the proceedings pursuant thereto cannot be said to be valid.”

The Court therefore treated the notice under Section 148A(b) as the foundational jurisdictional notice whose invalidity vitiated the entire reassessment proceeding. This approach was entirely consistent with settled law that reassessment jurisdiction is created only upon valid issuance of notice and that a notice issued to a dead person is nullity in law.

Most importantly, Hardeep Singh refused to permit curative participation by the legal heir to validate inherently void proceedings. Even though the legal heir had replied to the notice, the Court did not treat such participation as waiver, acquiescence, or estoppel against challenging jurisdiction. The decision correctly recognized that participation cannot confer jurisdiction where none exists.

2. The Departure in Vijender Pal Jain

The subsequent judgment in Vijender Pal Jain marks a noticeable shift away from the strict jurisdictional approach adopted in Hardeep Singh. In that case too, the Revenue was admittedly aware of the death of the assessee much prior to issuance of reassessment notice. Yet reassessment proceedings were initiated in the name and PAN of the deceased assessee.

The Court nevertheless upheld the validity of the notice on the reasoning that:

The notice mentioned the deceased assessee “through legal heir”;
The father of the deceased had responded as legal representative; and
By participating in proceedings, he had effectively accepted representative capacity.

With respect, this reasoning fundamentally mischaracterises the nature of the defect involved.

The issue was never one of improper service of notice. The issue was whether jurisdiction itself had validly vested in the Assessing Officer upon issuance of notice under Section 148A(b). Once the notice continued to be issued in the name and PAN of the deceased assessee, the defect went to the very root of jurisdiction and could not be cured through participation or estoppel.

The Court in Vijender Pal Jain erroneously shifted the inquiry from “valid assumption of jurisdiction” to “effective service of notice.” This analytical shift diluted the distinction between:

curable procedural irregularities; and
incurable jurisdictional defects.

3. Jurisdiction Cannot Arise by Estoppel

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Vijender Pal Jain is its reliance upon the conduct of the legal representative to sustain reassessment proceedings. The Court observed that since the father of the deceased assessee had responded as “legal representative,” he could not subsequently challenge the validity of notice.

This reasoning runs contrary to settled principles of public law and tax jurisprudence. It is trite law that:

there can be no estoppel against statute;
consent cannot confer jurisdiction; and
participation cannot cure absence of jurisdiction.

Jurisdictional defects strike at the authority of the officer to initiate proceedings and cannot be validated by acquiescence. If a notice is fundamentally void, subsequent participation does not breathe life into it.

Indeed, the Supreme Court in numerous contexts has repeatedly held that defects going to the root of jurisdiction cannot be waived by parties. The approach adopted in Vijender Pal Jain therefore risks unsettling long-established principles governing assumption of jurisdiction under taxing statutes.